Opinion: Turning to the Haqqanis,
Pakistan has made its choice
Pakistan has made its choice
The ISI’s ties to an insurgent network undermine any hope of real cooperation with the US
By Keith Yost
STAFF COLUMNIST
September 30, 2011
A pitfall of writing for this newspaper as frequently as I do is that sometimes a major event comes along and I find that I’ve already said most
of what I wish to say. Such is the case with Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s recent admonishment of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence for its
ties to the Haqqani insurgent network.
It’s difficult for me to add more than what I’ve already written in “While Karachi Slowly Burns” (Sept. 10, 2010), or “Mission Accomplished”
(May 6, 2011). Pakistan is a state with a major security problem — India — and two mutually-exclusive strategies to deal with that problem: a
stable security partnership with the United States, or an increasing reliance on jihadi proxies. The former is a realistic path, as Pakistan and
the United States have considerable mutual interests, while the latter is a monumental blunder, built on the quixotic notion that terrorists and
guerrillas can somehow bleed India down to parity despite its seven to one advantage in men and materiel.
We have long hoped that Pakistan would choose America, not terrorists, as the guarantors of its security, but that hope has been in vain.
Now, Admiral Mullen, Pakistan’s greatest remaining booster in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, has delivered what amounts to an
ultimatum: either Pakistan severs its connection with the militant groups that are attacking NATO forces in Afghanistan, or America will sever
its connection with Pakistan. The Pakistanis have refused to abandon the Haqqanis, and so the die is cast. The dissolution of the
relationship between the United States and Pakistan is a fait accompli; it is inconceivable that the U.S. Congress will renew billions of dollars
of aid for a country that is actively (and now publicly) engaged in the killing of U.S. troops.
The decision by the Obama administration to deliver the ultimatum to our nominal ally is not without its downsides. Our counter-terrorism
efforts, as well as our war-fighting in Afghanistan, rely a great deal on Pakistan’s cooperation. However, in the long run, given Pakistan’s
behavior, long-term U.S. interests in South and Central Asia are best served by a realignment toward India. The Obama administration
deserves praise for its execution of this realignment. Years have been spent carefully setting the stage, giving the Pakistanis every
opportunity to edge themselves back from their suicidal geopolitical strategy while simultaneously testing the waters of a U.S-India
partnership. And the choice of timing is impeccable: U.S. forces in Afghanistan are higher than they have ever been before, giving the U.S.
its maximal leverage against Pakistan, but the president’s political capital to remove those forces is also at its zenith, which undercuts
Pakistan’s main source of leverage over the U.S. — namely, its supply routes to Afghanistan.
It is important that Obama (or the next president of the United States) appreciates the gravity and finality implicit in Pakistan’s rebuff of
Mullen’s ultimatum. Already, some pundits are selling the cutesy notion of the U.S. being “frenemies” with Pakistan, as if international
relations followed a script out of some Hollywood high school drama. But there is no intermediate status between friends and enemies to be
found here — as the U.S. withdraws its support from Pakistan, Pakistan will compensate for this loss by relying even more strongly on
militant groups like the Haqqanis to provide for its national security. The break-up, once initiated, can only accelerate.
In the long run, the U.S. playbook on Pakistan should grow to resemble that of India’s. The way to neuter an enemy is to carve them up into
multiple states — such was Germany’s treatment by the allies after World War II, as well as the Soviet Union’s fate after its fall. India has
already cut Pakistan in half, dividing it between modern Pakistan and Bangladesh. It seeks to do so again, exploiting the ethnic fault lines in
Pakistani society to carve it up even further. With its parting shots in Afghanistan, the U.S. should use its military might to aid in this
strategy. In its least extreme form, this strategy might merely ensure that Baloch-dominated provinces within Afghanistan retain a
high degree of autonomy from the Afghan federal government. In its most extreme form, the U.S. could funnel arms to Baloch
nationalists in southern Pakistan or take direct action in support of a free Balochistan. Where the U.S. should fall on
this spectrum of policy choices is open to debate — what must be avoided is the naive optimism that Pakistan will have a Damascene
moment and suddenly become the ally that the U.S. requires. Now is the time to restructure Afghanistan in the way that makes Pakistan
weakest, not to dither in a nonexistent middle ground.
History will look upon Pakistan’s embrace of jihadists as one of the greatest geopolitical missteps of the 21st century. To prevent itself from
appearing with Pakistan in history’s list of blunderers, the U.S. must make its break with Pakistan a decisive one and resist the urge to force
nuance into a situation that deserves none.
SOURCE: http://tech.mit.edu/V131/N41/pakistan.html
By Keith Yost
STAFF COLUMNIST
September 30, 2011
A pitfall of writing for this newspaper as frequently as I do is that sometimes a major event comes along and I find that I’ve already said most
of what I wish to say. Such is the case with Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s recent admonishment of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence for its
ties to the Haqqani insurgent network.
It’s difficult for me to add more than what I’ve already written in “While Karachi Slowly Burns” (Sept. 10, 2010), or “Mission Accomplished”
(May 6, 2011). Pakistan is a state with a major security problem — India — and two mutually-exclusive strategies to deal with that problem: a
stable security partnership with the United States, or an increasing reliance on jihadi proxies. The former is a realistic path, as Pakistan and
the United States have considerable mutual interests, while the latter is a monumental blunder, built on the quixotic notion that terrorists and
guerrillas can somehow bleed India down to parity despite its seven to one advantage in men and materiel.
We have long hoped that Pakistan would choose America, not terrorists, as the guarantors of its security, but that hope has been in vain.
Now, Admiral Mullen, Pakistan’s greatest remaining booster in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, has delivered what amounts to an
ultimatum: either Pakistan severs its connection with the militant groups that are attacking NATO forces in Afghanistan, or America will sever
its connection with Pakistan. The Pakistanis have refused to abandon the Haqqanis, and so the die is cast. The dissolution of the
relationship between the United States and Pakistan is a fait accompli; it is inconceivable that the U.S. Congress will renew billions of dollars
of aid for a country that is actively (and now publicly) engaged in the killing of U.S. troops.
The decision by the Obama administration to deliver the ultimatum to our nominal ally is not without its downsides. Our counter-terrorism
efforts, as well as our war-fighting in Afghanistan, rely a great deal on Pakistan’s cooperation. However, in the long run, given Pakistan’s
behavior, long-term U.S. interests in South and Central Asia are best served by a realignment toward India. The Obama administration
deserves praise for its execution of this realignment. Years have been spent carefully setting the stage, giving the Pakistanis every
opportunity to edge themselves back from their suicidal geopolitical strategy while simultaneously testing the waters of a U.S-India
partnership. And the choice of timing is impeccable: U.S. forces in Afghanistan are higher than they have ever been before, giving the U.S.
its maximal leverage against Pakistan, but the president’s political capital to remove those forces is also at its zenith, which undercuts
Pakistan’s main source of leverage over the U.S. — namely, its supply routes to Afghanistan.
It is important that Obama (or the next president of the United States) appreciates the gravity and finality implicit in Pakistan’s rebuff of
Mullen’s ultimatum. Already, some pundits are selling the cutesy notion of the U.S. being “frenemies” with Pakistan, as if international
relations followed a script out of some Hollywood high school drama. But there is no intermediate status between friends and enemies to be
found here — as the U.S. withdraws its support from Pakistan, Pakistan will compensate for this loss by relying even more strongly on
militant groups like the Haqqanis to provide for its national security. The break-up, once initiated, can only accelerate.
In the long run, the U.S. playbook on Pakistan should grow to resemble that of India’s. The way to neuter an enemy is to carve them up into
multiple states — such was Germany’s treatment by the allies after World War II, as well as the Soviet Union’s fate after its fall. India has
already cut Pakistan in half, dividing it between modern Pakistan and Bangladesh. It seeks to do so again, exploiting the ethnic fault lines in
Pakistani society to carve it up even further. With its parting shots in Afghanistan, the U.S. should use its military might to aid in this
strategy. In its least extreme form, this strategy might merely ensure that Baloch-dominated provinces within Afghanistan retain a
high degree of autonomy from the Afghan federal government. In its most extreme form, the U.S. could funnel arms to Baloch
nationalists in southern Pakistan or take direct action in support of a free Balochistan. Where the U.S. should fall on
this spectrum of policy choices is open to debate — what must be avoided is the naive optimism that Pakistan will have a Damascene
moment and suddenly become the ally that the U.S. requires. Now is the time to restructure Afghanistan in the way that makes Pakistan
weakest, not to dither in a nonexistent middle ground.
History will look upon Pakistan’s embrace of jihadists as one of the greatest geopolitical missteps of the 21st century. To prevent itself from
appearing with Pakistan in history’s list of blunderers, the U.S. must make its break with Pakistan a decisive one and resist the urge to force
nuance into a situation that deserves none.
SOURCE: http://tech.mit.edu/V131/N41/pakistan.html