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| Baloch Society Of North America (BSO_NA) Baloch Society Of North America (BSO_NA) is Non-Profit Organization, working to unite and Organize all Baloch in North America, to expose the Occupation of our land (Balochistan) and exploitations of our resources by Pakistani and Iranian Governments, and to bring their Human Rights Violations in Balochistan into the world’s Notice. |
VIEW: Winning what?
By Dr Haider K Nizamani
Baloch nationalists, including the much-maligned Sardars, would tell a visitor that today there are more military and
paramilitary forces in the Baloch regions than primary teachers. Evidence does not support the blame that Sardars
do not let education flourish in the region
A just published monograph by the London-based Foreign Policy Centre, titled Balochis of Pakistan: On the
Margins of History, adopts the narrative of Baloch maximalists, and argues that ‘with the gradual dismantling of the
age-old Sardari (tribal leader) system, a new generation of leaders is taking roots among Balochis’ and they are at
the forefront of the Baloch struggle.
What is offered by way of historical background is summation of various internecine conflicts among assorted
warlords, chieftains, and extra-regional bigger powers. We hardly get any idea about the political economy of the
region that sustained such a non-state mode of governance; neither does the monograph offer an insight into the
condition of people during these periods.
The monograph is anchored in the case for an independent Balochistan. “The legal status of Kalat was different
from that of other princely states in the Indian subcontinent” [p. 18] because Kalat, along with Bhutan and Sikkim,
belonged to category ‘B’ and the treaty sealed in 1876 “provided for the independence of Kalat in internal
jurisdictions and non-interference in domestic affairs”. Using this logic the author argues that Kalat was under no
obligation to join either India or Pakistan [p. 19].
This may sound a legally safe argument, but overlooks the context of Partition and the broader context in which the
two dominions (India and Pakistan) were to emerge. A number of princes had made a similar argument but in the
wake of the larger versions of two nationalisms (pan-Indian nationalism of the Congress Party and the Two Nation
Theory of Muslim League) what remained to be sorted out about the princely states was to 1946-47 the men who
mattered at the high-table of political sorting out of the subcontinent were Gandhis, Nehrus and Jinnahs. The
Nizam of Hyderabad, Hari Singh of Kashmir, and the Khan of Kalat were politically not in any position to have
realistically entertained the idea of sovereign existence of territories which they had been ruling.
On contemporary Balochistan, the monograph is correct in observing that the Pakistani state has done nothing to
dismantle the Sardari system and replace it with an egalitarian system. Pakistani state-managers’ social
engineering and political arrangements have never been on those lines. What remains beyond doubt is the dismal
state of human development indices among the Baloch of the province.
According to the Statistics Division, 44 percent of Pakistanis age 10 and above have completed primary education.
Jhal Magsi region of Balochistan has the dubious distinction of topping the list where only 20 percent of the
population has ever attended a school. Other Baloch regions do not lag behind Jhal Magsi.
Baloch nationalists, including the much-maligned Sardars, would tell a visitor that today there are more military and
paramilitary forces in the Baloch regions than primary teachers. Evidence does not support the blame that Sardars
do not let education flourish in the region. Those who have been involved in spreading, enhancing, and upgrading
schools in the Baloch regions of the province have not faced any noticeable local resistance from the Sardars or
the ordinary Baloch.
On top of this, the state has let loose on the province its intelligence agencies who pick up people at random. The
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its report published in January 2006 mentions widespread practice of
‘disappearances’ . A sense of historical injustice, the exploitation of the region’s natural resources, lack of political
participation and blatant violation of political and civil liberties have led to palpable disaffection among the Baloch.
Pushed to the wall, a common leitmotif among the maximalist Baloch nationalists is that the only solution lies in
establishing an independent Balochistan. Expressions of this view can be found in overseas organisations like the
Baloch Society of North America which claims to be working to unite all the Baloch in North America ‘to expose the
Occupations (sic) and Oppressive (sic) policies of Pakistani and Iranian governments against Baloch people and
our Baloch land (Balochistan) .’
If we map the responses of Baloch nationalists, they range from seeking total independence through armed
struggle to securing a more equitable share in the governance and resources of the state. The number of those
who want to negotiate greater autonomy within the existing Pakistani state structure is fast dwindling. As
Balochistan becomes more violent, they find it hard to stick to their moderate position.
Late Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, who represented the autonomists ended up with the soubriquet of Baba-e-Muzakirat
(Father of Negotiations) because of his apparent failure to convince the authorities in Islamabad to re-write the
political contract between the Centre and Balochistan. Nationalists in Balochistan have either already taken, or are
leaning towards, a maximalist position as adopted by the veteran Baloch leader Khair Bakash Marri, the elusive
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and even the Baloch intelligentsia at home and abroad.
Autonomists, who work within the framework of greater autonomy for the province, place more emphasis on factors
such as the exploitation of Balochistan’s resources and the non-participation of the Baloch in public policymaking
at the provincial and federal levels.
Maximalists, on the other hand, take a long historical view and tend to rely on the argument that Balochistan was an
independent entity until it was forcibly made a part of Pakistan. Nothing short of a sovereign Balochistan will satisfy
them. Disappointed with the talk of democracy and the expectation of fair representation within the existing statist
framework, they recommend and, to some extent, practice the means of armed struggle as the only long-term
viable option available to the Baloch. Both, however, agree on Centre’s exploitation of Balochistan’s natural
resources.
There are some key issues of political nature that the proponents of independent Balochistan have to iron out. The
demand for greater sovereign Balochistan is irredentist in nature since any talk of greater Balochistan would entail
the vivisection of Iran as well as Afghanistan. Then there is the perennial Pashtun question in Balochistan; there is
also the Baloch-Brohi divide. Are they going to divide the Pakistani Balochistan in two parts and let the Pashtun
decide their own fate? These are secondary concerns among the Baloch maximalists who appear determined to
fight a long guerrilla war. The Musharraf regime has made no secret of militarily defeating the insurgency. This
promises a vicious cycle of violence whose futility is best captured by a soldier character in a Woody Allen movie.
The Russian conscript is told by his senior about the basic rule of the war: “If we kill them, we win. If they kill us,
they win.”
The perplexed soldier asks, “Win what?”
The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver Canada and
can be reached at
By Dr Haider K Nizamani
Baloch nationalists, including the much-maligned Sardars, would tell a visitor that today there are more military and
paramilitary forces in the Baloch regions than primary teachers. Evidence does not support the blame that Sardars
do not let education flourish in the region
A just published monograph by the London-based Foreign Policy Centre, titled Balochis of Pakistan: On the
Margins of History, adopts the narrative of Baloch maximalists, and argues that ‘with the gradual dismantling of the
age-old Sardari (tribal leader) system, a new generation of leaders is taking roots among Balochis’ and they are at
the forefront of the Baloch struggle.
What is offered by way of historical background is summation of various internecine conflicts among assorted
warlords, chieftains, and extra-regional bigger powers. We hardly get any idea about the political economy of the
region that sustained such a non-state mode of governance; neither does the monograph offer an insight into the
condition of people during these periods.
The monograph is anchored in the case for an independent Balochistan. “The legal status of Kalat was different
from that of other princely states in the Indian subcontinent” [p. 18] because Kalat, along with Bhutan and Sikkim,
belonged to category ‘B’ and the treaty sealed in 1876 “provided for the independence of Kalat in internal
jurisdictions and non-interference in domestic affairs”. Using this logic the author argues that Kalat was under no
obligation to join either India or Pakistan [p. 19].
This may sound a legally safe argument, but overlooks the context of Partition and the broader context in which the
two dominions (India and Pakistan) were to emerge. A number of princes had made a similar argument but in the
wake of the larger versions of two nationalisms (pan-Indian nationalism of the Congress Party and the Two Nation
Theory of Muslim League) what remained to be sorted out about the princely states was to 1946-47 the men who
mattered at the high-table of political sorting out of the subcontinent were Gandhis, Nehrus and Jinnahs. The
Nizam of Hyderabad, Hari Singh of Kashmir, and the Khan of Kalat were politically not in any position to have
realistically entertained the idea of sovereign existence of territories which they had been ruling.
On contemporary Balochistan, the monograph is correct in observing that the Pakistani state has done nothing to
dismantle the Sardari system and replace it with an egalitarian system. Pakistani state-managers’ social
engineering and political arrangements have never been on those lines. What remains beyond doubt is the dismal
state of human development indices among the Baloch of the province.
According to the Statistics Division, 44 percent of Pakistanis age 10 and above have completed primary education.
Jhal Magsi region of Balochistan has the dubious distinction of topping the list where only 20 percent of the
population has ever attended a school. Other Baloch regions do not lag behind Jhal Magsi.
Baloch nationalists, including the much-maligned Sardars, would tell a visitor that today there are more military and
paramilitary forces in the Baloch regions than primary teachers. Evidence does not support the blame that Sardars
do not let education flourish in the region. Those who have been involved in spreading, enhancing, and upgrading
schools in the Baloch regions of the province have not faced any noticeable local resistance from the Sardars or
the ordinary Baloch.
On top of this, the state has let loose on the province its intelligence agencies who pick up people at random. The
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its report published in January 2006 mentions widespread practice of
‘disappearances’ . A sense of historical injustice, the exploitation of the region’s natural resources, lack of political
participation and blatant violation of political and civil liberties have led to palpable disaffection among the Baloch.
Pushed to the wall, a common leitmotif among the maximalist Baloch nationalists is that the only solution lies in
establishing an independent Balochistan. Expressions of this view can be found in overseas organisations like the
Baloch Society of North America which claims to be working to unite all the Baloch in North America ‘to expose the
Occupations (sic) and Oppressive (sic) policies of Pakistani and Iranian governments against Baloch people and
our Baloch land (Balochistan) .’
If we map the responses of Baloch nationalists, they range from seeking total independence through armed
struggle to securing a more equitable share in the governance and resources of the state. The number of those
who want to negotiate greater autonomy within the existing Pakistani state structure is fast dwindling. As
Balochistan becomes more violent, they find it hard to stick to their moderate position.
Late Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, who represented the autonomists ended up with the soubriquet of Baba-e-Muzakirat
(Father of Negotiations) because of his apparent failure to convince the authorities in Islamabad to re-write the
political contract between the Centre and Balochistan. Nationalists in Balochistan have either already taken, or are
leaning towards, a maximalist position as adopted by the veteran Baloch leader Khair Bakash Marri, the elusive
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and even the Baloch intelligentsia at home and abroad.
Autonomists, who work within the framework of greater autonomy for the province, place more emphasis on factors
such as the exploitation of Balochistan’s resources and the non-participation of the Baloch in public policymaking
at the provincial and federal levels.
Maximalists, on the other hand, take a long historical view and tend to rely on the argument that Balochistan was an
independent entity until it was forcibly made a part of Pakistan. Nothing short of a sovereign Balochistan will satisfy
them. Disappointed with the talk of democracy and the expectation of fair representation within the existing statist
framework, they recommend and, to some extent, practice the means of armed struggle as the only long-term
viable option available to the Baloch. Both, however, agree on Centre’s exploitation of Balochistan’s natural
resources.
There are some key issues of political nature that the proponents of independent Balochistan have to iron out. The
demand for greater sovereign Balochistan is irredentist in nature since any talk of greater Balochistan would entail
the vivisection of Iran as well as Afghanistan. Then there is the perennial Pashtun question in Balochistan; there is
also the Baloch-Brohi divide. Are they going to divide the Pakistani Balochistan in two parts and let the Pashtun
decide their own fate? These are secondary concerns among the Baloch maximalists who appear determined to
fight a long guerrilla war. The Musharraf regime has made no secret of militarily defeating the insurgency. This
promises a vicious cycle of violence whose futility is best captured by a soldier character in a Woody Allen movie.
The Russian conscript is told by his senior about the basic rule of the war: “If we kill them, we win. If they kill us,
they win.”
The perplexed soldier asks, “Win what?”
The writer teaches at the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver Canada and
can be reached at
