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The Jamestown Foundation: Violence and rebellion in Iranian
Balochistan
PRESS RELEASE:
Wednesday, July 05, 2006
KALAT, Balochistan – Global Terrorism Analysis (GTA) is produced by The Jamestown Foundation. Since
September 11, 2003, Jamestown has been publishing Terrorism Monitor, a bi-weekly journal providing in-depth,
objective analysis on al-Qaeda and the War on Terror. Jamestown has continually expanded on its coverage of
terrorism and security issues, utilizing indigenous sources and with attention paid to frequently un-reported or under-
reported topics. Spotlight on Terror is our occasional publication with interviews, special features or analysis of
breaking news. Terrorism Focus began publication in August 2004 as a bi-weekly complement to Terrorism
Monitor, and has since found a niche in providing timely analysis on events in global terrorism, with extensive
translations and assessments of jihad on the web.
The article, "Violence and rebellion in Iranian Balochistan" by Chris Zambelis was published recently in GTA, and it
is reproduced below for our reader’s convenience:
Balochistan
PRESS RELEASE:
Wednesday, July 05, 2006
KALAT, Balochistan – Global Terrorism Analysis (GTA) is produced by The Jamestown Foundation. Since
September 11, 2003, Jamestown has been publishing Terrorism Monitor, a bi-weekly journal providing in-depth,
objective analysis on al-Qaeda and the War on Terror. Jamestown has continually expanded on its coverage of
terrorism and security issues, utilizing indigenous sources and with attention paid to frequently un-reported or under-
reported topics. Spotlight on Terror is our occasional publication with interviews, special features or analysis of
breaking news. Terrorism Focus began publication in August 2004 as a bi-weekly complement to Terrorism
Monitor, and has since found a niche in providing timely analysis on events in global terrorism, with extensive
translations and assessments of jihad on the web.
The article, "Violence and rebellion in Iranian Balochistan" by Chris Zambelis was published recently in GTA, and it
is reproduced below for our reader’s convenience:
"Violence and rebellion in Iranian Balochistan
By CHRIS ZAMBELIS (Global Terrorism Analysis)
The escalating insurgency in Pakistan's southwestern province of Balochistan
and neighboring regions receives extensive media coverage. Aside from the
need to root out radical Islamist opposition movements tied to al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, Pakistan faces a series of domestic threats based on ethnic,
sectarian and regional rivalries and grievances. Internal tensions also stem
from Pakistan's failure to integrate disparate ethnic, religious and tribal
communities in its outlying regions into the fabric of a unified state structure
that transcends other allegiances (Terrorism Focus, March 21).
By CHRIS ZAMBELIS (Global Terrorism Analysis)
The escalating insurgency in Pakistan's southwestern province of Balochistan
and neighboring regions receives extensive media coverage. Aside from the
need to root out radical Islamist opposition movements tied to al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, Pakistan faces a series of domestic threats based on ethnic,
sectarian and regional rivalries and grievances. Internal tensions also stem
from Pakistan's failure to integrate disparate ethnic, religious and tribal
communities in its outlying regions into the fabric of a unified state structure
that transcends other allegiances (Terrorism Focus, March 21).
In contrast, evidence of a simmering rebellion and escalating violence between Tehran's own ethnic Baloch minority
and Iranian security forces in Iran's vast but sparsely populated southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan is
receiving far less attention. Iranian officials and other observers implicate an obscure Baloch militant organization
known as Jundallah (Soldiers of God) for spearheading the uprising. The Baloch campaign in Iranian Balochistan,
sometimes referred to as West Balochistan by Baloch nationalists, is also being waged online through a
sophisticated network of independent news, activist and nationalist websites and chat forums hosted in the region
and abroad in multiple languages. Many of these websites openly support the activities of Jundallah and violence in
general against Tehran and others perceived to be oppressing Baloch in the region [1].
Ideology and Identity
Iranian Baloch see themselves as the heirs of an ancient and proud tradition distinct from Iran's ethnic Persian
population—that make up a slim majority in Iran—and other groups that comprise the Islamic Republic. Iranian
Baloch often identify with the larger Baloch community that resides in Pakistan and Afghanistan in what is referred to
as "Greater Balochistan" because tribal and family lines traverse all three countries. The Baloch historical narrative
is shaped by a collective sense of oppression and victimization by the imperial machinations of regional and
colonial powers that have led to the division of the Baloch nation. One Baloch nationalist website directed toward
Western audiences compares the historic plight of the Baloch to that of the Kurds and their longing for a Kurdish
state (http://www.baloch2000.org).
Unlike most Iranians who are Shiites, the overwhelming majority of Iran's Baloch population adheres to the Sunni
branch of Islam. Despite a lack of concrete evidence, Iranian authorities and some analysts believe that Jundallah
may have ties to Sunni Islamist extremists associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating across the border in
neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan. These allegations are likely based on Jundallah's reliance on religious
symbols and discourse in expressing its nationalist aspirations and deep-seated resentment toward the Shiite-
dominated Iranian state. Baloch nationalist organizations also emphasize the Sunni-Shiite element—real or
perceived—in the nascent conflict, further proof in Tehran's view of the group's Sunni extremist pedigree. Jundallah
is also reported to operate under different names that reflect its purported Islamist bent, including Fedayeen-e-Islam
(those who sacrifice for Islam) (Asia Times, June 8).
At the same time, tribal allegiances and centers of authority built on family lineage traditionally supersede strict
religious adherence among the semi-nomadic Baloch. Instead, Iranian Baloch practice a form of tribal Islam. Many
observers argue that Tehran is exaggerating the alleged role of al-Qaeda in the Baloch insurgency in an effort to
divert attention from the problems affecting Sistan-Balochistan and to tarnish the Baloch cause. It could also be a
way for Tehran to curry favor with the United States amidst pressure to concede on its nuclear ambitions and its
meddling in Iraq. Hardliners in Tehran downplay ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iran. They instead blame foreign
intelligence services with an interest in destabilizing the country through the support of restive minorities (Asia
Times, June 8; al-Jazeera, October 17, 2005).
Although Pakistani Balochistan remains a stronghold of Taliban elements and their local sympathizers, Baloch
nationalists there rely far less on Sunni Islamist discourse in framing their cause and instead emphasize ethnic and
tribal identity and economic grievances (Deccan Herald, August 12, 2004). Given its large Sunni majority, a Baloch
nationalist campaign framed in religious rhetoric would have less resonance in Pakistan. In this sense, Baloch
nationalists in Iran may be using Sunni discourse to highlight their distinct place in Shiite-dominated Iran as an
oppressed and disadvantaged ethnic and religious minority (The Nation, December 23, 2005).
Jundallah Militancy
Little is known about Jundallah's origins. The group is led by Abdulmalak Rigi, a 23 year-old Iranian Baloch (http:
//www.roozonline.com). It is believed to have emerged on the scene in 2003 and is known for bold attacks against
high-profile targets, especially government and security officials. In a May telephone interview with Rooz, an Iranian
online newspaper, Rigi defended Jundallah's use of violence as a just means to defend Baloch and Sunni Muslim
interests in Iran and to draw attention to the plight of his people whom he describes as Iran's poorest and the
victims of genocide. Significantly, Rigi declares himself an Iranian and Iran as his home. He also claims not to
harbor separatist aspirations. Instead, according to Rigi, Jundallah's goal is to improve the life of Iranian Baloch
(http://www.roozonline.com).
In June 2005, Jundallah claimed responsibility for the abduction of a team of Iranian security and intelligence
officers traveling in a convoy in Iranian Balochistan along the Pakistani border. In a videotaped ultimatum released
to al-Arabiya television, the group justified its attack as revenge against Iranian security forces for committing
alleged atrocities in the region. The tape included a demand for the release of Jundallah members and other
Baloch activists detained in state prisons in exchange for the safe release of the hostages. Jundallah released a
second video statement three weeks later showing the execution of Shehab Mansuri, whom the group claimed was
an Iranian intelligence officer (Iran Daily, January 21; al-Arabiya, June 2005).
Another operation in mid-March included the abduction and assassination of several Iranian security officials,
including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and aid officials affiliated with the Islamic
Red Crescent. A similar operation in May claimed another 12 victims. The group has also been implicated in several
strikes against infrastructure in Iranian Balochistan and outside of the province (al-Jazeera, March 22).
Baloch nationalist websites frequently post graphic photographs and video footage of alleged Iranian security
operations and atrocities committed against Iranian Baloch civilians (http://www.balochwarna.org). The official
website of the Balochistan People's Party (BPP), a movement advocating the federalization of Iran and what it
describes as Baloch sovereignty within a democratic Iran, describes a recent Iranian military operation that allegedly
commenced on May 15 as the "Islamic clerical regime's atrocities towards Sunni Baloch" and included helicopter
gunships and airstrikes against civilian centers in Sistan-Balochistan. The website also includes visual evidence of
what it claims are innocent victims of Tehran's crackdown and the recent killing of Sunni Baloch clerics by Iranian
security forces (http://www.balochpeople.org).
It is unclear whether a group operating under the name Jundallah in Pakistani Balochistan is affiliated with its
Iranian counterpart, although Tehran and Islamabad claim that Baloch militants on both sides of the border
cooperate in the area of arms and narcotics trafficking and financing (The News International, January 8; Asia
Times, June 8). Given the lawless and porous border region dividing Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan, it is difficult
to determine whether this cross-border activity is linked to Jundallah's campaign or everyday crime typical in the
region.
Historically, Tehran and Islamabad have collaborated in suppressing Baloch nationalism, often through brutal
military crackdowns. Both countries see Baloch nationalism as a serious threat to regional stability and the territorial
integrity of both states. Ongoing negotiations over the construction of a proposed pipeline that would deliver Iranian
natural gas to Pakistan and India, much of which would traverse large swaths of Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan,
is another point of concern that brings both sides together on the threat posed by Baloch nationalism and the
emergence of groups such as Jundallah (Dawn, June 10).
An Underserved Community
Accurate demographic data on Iran's ethnic Baloch minority does not exist, largely for political reasons. In fact, the
same holds for Iran's other ethnic and religious minorities, especially the sizeable Azerbaijani, Kurdish and Arab
communities. Unofficial estimates of Iran's Baloch population range between one million and upwards of four
million. The overwhelming majority of Baloch reside in Pakistan, while the rest inhabit parts of Afghanistan, totaling
between 10 and 15 million.
Iranian Balochistan represents one of Iran's most impoverished and underserved regions. This is partially due to
the region's inhospitable and arid climate. Sistan-Balochistan is also considered a lawless territory where the
central government holds little sway. Years of systematic neglect and mismanagement by Tehran are also to blame
for the social and economic despair and backwardness that characterize the region. Baloch in Iran suffer from high
illiteracy and an overall lack of public services compared to the rest of the country. They are also marginalized
politically by Tehran. A Baloch website reportedly run by the BLA claims that Tehran and its neighbors maintain a
longstanding policy of suppressing Baloch culture and identity. This includes schemes designed to deliberately
impoverish the region in order to ensure the inferior status of ethnic Baloch in Iran and elsewhere in the geographic
area (http://www.balochvoice.com).
Conclusion
Tehran's resort to force in quelling the uprising in Sistan-Balochistan through deployments of special and regular
army units is not likely to contribute to lasting peace and stability in the region. Since Iranian Baloch grievances run
deep, movements such as Jundallah will maintain a sizeable following among the population. Although there is no
credible evidence implicating the group of al-Qaeda's brand of radicalism or the strain of Taliban-style Sunni
extremism violently opposed to Shiite Islam found in parts of Pakistan, Jundallah's cause does have the potential to
be hijacked by militants with a different agenda. This has serious implications for stability, not only in Iran's Sistan-
Balochistan province, but Pakistani Balochistan as well. At the same time, despite its Sunni Islamist rhetoric,
Jundallah's agenda to date remains fixated on Iranian Baloch causes.
Notes
1. For a list of links to a diverse array of Baloch news, activist and nationalist websites that purport to feature detailed
accounts of fighting in Iranian Balochistan and Pakistani Balochistan, including graphic photographs and video of
alleged victims and military operations, visit the homepage of the Stockholm-based Radio Balochistan, http://www.
radiobalochi.org. The Baloch nationalist website hosted by the self-proclaimed "Government of Balochistan in Exile"
also contains useful information from a Baloch nationalist perspective, http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.
com."
Baloch News Bureau Report
Mir Azaad Khan Baloch
General Secretary
The Government of Balochistan in Exile
http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.com/
and Iranian security forces in Iran's vast but sparsely populated southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan is
receiving far less attention. Iranian officials and other observers implicate an obscure Baloch militant organization
known as Jundallah (Soldiers of God) for spearheading the uprising. The Baloch campaign in Iranian Balochistan,
sometimes referred to as West Balochistan by Baloch nationalists, is also being waged online through a
sophisticated network of independent news, activist and nationalist websites and chat forums hosted in the region
and abroad in multiple languages. Many of these websites openly support the activities of Jundallah and violence in
general against Tehran and others perceived to be oppressing Baloch in the region [1].
Ideology and Identity
Iranian Baloch see themselves as the heirs of an ancient and proud tradition distinct from Iran's ethnic Persian
population—that make up a slim majority in Iran—and other groups that comprise the Islamic Republic. Iranian
Baloch often identify with the larger Baloch community that resides in Pakistan and Afghanistan in what is referred to
as "Greater Balochistan" because tribal and family lines traverse all three countries. The Baloch historical narrative
is shaped by a collective sense of oppression and victimization by the imperial machinations of regional and
colonial powers that have led to the division of the Baloch nation. One Baloch nationalist website directed toward
Western audiences compares the historic plight of the Baloch to that of the Kurds and their longing for a Kurdish
state (http://www.baloch2000.org).
Unlike most Iranians who are Shiites, the overwhelming majority of Iran's Baloch population adheres to the Sunni
branch of Islam. Despite a lack of concrete evidence, Iranian authorities and some analysts believe that Jundallah
may have ties to Sunni Islamist extremists associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating across the border in
neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan. These allegations are likely based on Jundallah's reliance on religious
symbols and discourse in expressing its nationalist aspirations and deep-seated resentment toward the Shiite-
dominated Iranian state. Baloch nationalist organizations also emphasize the Sunni-Shiite element—real or
perceived—in the nascent conflict, further proof in Tehran's view of the group's Sunni extremist pedigree. Jundallah
is also reported to operate under different names that reflect its purported Islamist bent, including Fedayeen-e-Islam
(those who sacrifice for Islam) (Asia Times, June 8).
At the same time, tribal allegiances and centers of authority built on family lineage traditionally supersede strict
religious adherence among the semi-nomadic Baloch. Instead, Iranian Baloch practice a form of tribal Islam. Many
observers argue that Tehran is exaggerating the alleged role of al-Qaeda in the Baloch insurgency in an effort to
divert attention from the problems affecting Sistan-Balochistan and to tarnish the Baloch cause. It could also be a
way for Tehran to curry favor with the United States amidst pressure to concede on its nuclear ambitions and its
meddling in Iraq. Hardliners in Tehran downplay ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iran. They instead blame foreign
intelligence services with an interest in destabilizing the country through the support of restive minorities (Asia
Times, June 8; al-Jazeera, October 17, 2005).
Although Pakistani Balochistan remains a stronghold of Taliban elements and their local sympathizers, Baloch
nationalists there rely far less on Sunni Islamist discourse in framing their cause and instead emphasize ethnic and
tribal identity and economic grievances (Deccan Herald, August 12, 2004). Given its large Sunni majority, a Baloch
nationalist campaign framed in religious rhetoric would have less resonance in Pakistan. In this sense, Baloch
nationalists in Iran may be using Sunni discourse to highlight their distinct place in Shiite-dominated Iran as an
oppressed and disadvantaged ethnic and religious minority (The Nation, December 23, 2005).
Jundallah Militancy
Little is known about Jundallah's origins. The group is led by Abdulmalak Rigi, a 23 year-old Iranian Baloch (http:
//www.roozonline.com). It is believed to have emerged on the scene in 2003 and is known for bold attacks against
high-profile targets, especially government and security officials. In a May telephone interview with Rooz, an Iranian
online newspaper, Rigi defended Jundallah's use of violence as a just means to defend Baloch and Sunni Muslim
interests in Iran and to draw attention to the plight of his people whom he describes as Iran's poorest and the
victims of genocide. Significantly, Rigi declares himself an Iranian and Iran as his home. He also claims not to
harbor separatist aspirations. Instead, according to Rigi, Jundallah's goal is to improve the life of Iranian Baloch
(http://www.roozonline.com).
In June 2005, Jundallah claimed responsibility for the abduction of a team of Iranian security and intelligence
officers traveling in a convoy in Iranian Balochistan along the Pakistani border. In a videotaped ultimatum released
to al-Arabiya television, the group justified its attack as revenge against Iranian security forces for committing
alleged atrocities in the region. The tape included a demand for the release of Jundallah members and other
Baloch activists detained in state prisons in exchange for the safe release of the hostages. Jundallah released a
second video statement three weeks later showing the execution of Shehab Mansuri, whom the group claimed was
an Iranian intelligence officer (Iran Daily, January 21; al-Arabiya, June 2005).
Another operation in mid-March included the abduction and assassination of several Iranian security officials,
including members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and aid officials affiliated with the Islamic
Red Crescent. A similar operation in May claimed another 12 victims. The group has also been implicated in several
strikes against infrastructure in Iranian Balochistan and outside of the province (al-Jazeera, March 22).
Baloch nationalist websites frequently post graphic photographs and video footage of alleged Iranian security
operations and atrocities committed against Iranian Baloch civilians (http://www.balochwarna.org). The official
website of the Balochistan People's Party (BPP), a movement advocating the federalization of Iran and what it
describes as Baloch sovereignty within a democratic Iran, describes a recent Iranian military operation that allegedly
commenced on May 15 as the "Islamic clerical regime's atrocities towards Sunni Baloch" and included helicopter
gunships and airstrikes against civilian centers in Sistan-Balochistan. The website also includes visual evidence of
what it claims are innocent victims of Tehran's crackdown and the recent killing of Sunni Baloch clerics by Iranian
security forces (http://www.balochpeople.org).
It is unclear whether a group operating under the name Jundallah in Pakistani Balochistan is affiliated with its
Iranian counterpart, although Tehran and Islamabad claim that Baloch militants on both sides of the border
cooperate in the area of arms and narcotics trafficking and financing (The News International, January 8; Asia
Times, June 8). Given the lawless and porous border region dividing Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan, it is difficult
to determine whether this cross-border activity is linked to Jundallah's campaign or everyday crime typical in the
region.
Historically, Tehran and Islamabad have collaborated in suppressing Baloch nationalism, often through brutal
military crackdowns. Both countries see Baloch nationalism as a serious threat to regional stability and the territorial
integrity of both states. Ongoing negotiations over the construction of a proposed pipeline that would deliver Iranian
natural gas to Pakistan and India, much of which would traverse large swaths of Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan,
is another point of concern that brings both sides together on the threat posed by Baloch nationalism and the
emergence of groups such as Jundallah (Dawn, June 10).
An Underserved Community
Accurate demographic data on Iran's ethnic Baloch minority does not exist, largely for political reasons. In fact, the
same holds for Iran's other ethnic and religious minorities, especially the sizeable Azerbaijani, Kurdish and Arab
communities. Unofficial estimates of Iran's Baloch population range between one million and upwards of four
million. The overwhelming majority of Baloch reside in Pakistan, while the rest inhabit parts of Afghanistan, totaling
between 10 and 15 million.
Iranian Balochistan represents one of Iran's most impoverished and underserved regions. This is partially due to
the region's inhospitable and arid climate. Sistan-Balochistan is also considered a lawless territory where the
central government holds little sway. Years of systematic neglect and mismanagement by Tehran are also to blame
for the social and economic despair and backwardness that characterize the region. Baloch in Iran suffer from high
illiteracy and an overall lack of public services compared to the rest of the country. They are also marginalized
politically by Tehran. A Baloch website reportedly run by the BLA claims that Tehran and its neighbors maintain a
longstanding policy of suppressing Baloch culture and identity. This includes schemes designed to deliberately
impoverish the region in order to ensure the inferior status of ethnic Baloch in Iran and elsewhere in the geographic
area (http://www.balochvoice.com).
Conclusion
Tehran's resort to force in quelling the uprising in Sistan-Balochistan through deployments of special and regular
army units is not likely to contribute to lasting peace and stability in the region. Since Iranian Baloch grievances run
deep, movements such as Jundallah will maintain a sizeable following among the population. Although there is no
credible evidence implicating the group of al-Qaeda's brand of radicalism or the strain of Taliban-style Sunni
extremism violently opposed to Shiite Islam found in parts of Pakistan, Jundallah's cause does have the potential to
be hijacked by militants with a different agenda. This has serious implications for stability, not only in Iran's Sistan-
Balochistan province, but Pakistani Balochistan as well. At the same time, despite its Sunni Islamist rhetoric,
Jundallah's agenda to date remains fixated on Iranian Baloch causes.
Notes
1. For a list of links to a diverse array of Baloch news, activist and nationalist websites that purport to feature detailed
accounts of fighting in Iranian Balochistan and Pakistani Balochistan, including graphic photographs and video of
alleged victims and military operations, visit the homepage of the Stockholm-based Radio Balochistan, http://www.
radiobalochi.org. The Baloch nationalist website hosted by the self-proclaimed "Government of Balochistan in Exile"
also contains useful information from a Baloch nationalist perspective, http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.
com."
Baloch News Bureau Report
Mir Azaad Khan Baloch
General Secretary
The Government of Balochistan in Exile
http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.com/
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