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| May 28th, 1998: A Black Day in Balochistan On May 28, 1998 Pakistan Carried out its five nuclear tests is Balochistan. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub- kiloton nuclear devices. On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted in Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation. These Nuclear Tests were carried out even the Baloch people said “NO” to all kind of nuclear testing in Balochistan. Baloch Society Of North America Condemn that Pakistani crime against Baloch people and asks the United Nation, the International Community and the International court of Justice to investigate the effects of that nuclear tests and the Baloch losses including homelessness and dislocation must be compensated. |
Pakistan's Nuclear Tests
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani
Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic
signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that
one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests
were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by
Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained
emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently
confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have
reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two
weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However,
seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras
Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.
DEVICE DATE YIELD
[announced] YIELD
[estimated]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced
yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona
Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the
yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the
atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-
grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or
produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11
and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers
Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of
ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic
advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure,
Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen.
Pervez Musharraf took over.
Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A.
Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has
been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in
operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan
built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan
announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this
unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per
year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded
with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow
Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of
Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant,
neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear
warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons.
Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched
uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has
also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated
3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores
are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately
from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear
weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons
fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their
nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can
be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that
intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear
weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his
intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an
attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In
November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press
reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment
program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Source: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/index.html
Related Links:
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani
Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic
signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that
one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests
were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by
Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained
emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently
confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have
reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two
weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However,
seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras
Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.
DEVICE DATE YIELD
[announced] YIELD
[estimated]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced
yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona
Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the
yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the
atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-
grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or
produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11
and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers
Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of
ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic
advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure,
Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen.
Pervez Musharraf took over.
Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A.
Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has
been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in
operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan
built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan
announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this
unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per
year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded
with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow
Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of
Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant,
neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear
warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons.
Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched
uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has
also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated
3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores
are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately
from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear
weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons
fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their
nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can
be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that
intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear
weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his
intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an
attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In
November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press
reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment
program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Source: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/index.html
Related Links:
- Ninth anniversary of Nuclear blast in Balochistan: A Letter By Ahmar Mustikhan
-
Pakistan's Nuclear Tests in Balochistan (Urdu Article)
-
BALOCH FREEDOM FIGHTERS ATTACK NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENT
-
Photos of the Test site
-
The Tale of Raskoh A Baloch Warna Video
-
Pakistan nuclear test (A Video)
| all Baloch in North America, to expose the Occupation of our land (Balochistan) and exploitations of our resources by Pakistani and Iranian Governments, and to bring their Human Rights Violations in Balochistan into the world’s Notice. |